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“I wish you well in this particularly important theater of the struggle against 
pseudoscience: the national security state has many unfair and cruel weapons in its arsenal, 
but that of junk science is one which can be fought and perhaps defeated by honest and 
forthright efforts like yours.” –Letter from Aldrich Ames to Steven Aftergood at the 
Federation of American Scientists.1 
 
* Ariela Rutbeck-Goldman is a 2016 graduate of the University of California, Irvine School of Law.  
The author is extremely grateful to Bob Solomon, Zina Rutkin, Robert Becker, and Harris Rutbeck-
Goldman for their wisdom and support throughout this process.  Many thanks to the UC Irvine Law 
Review for its thoughtful assistance. Last but certainly not least, the author wishes to express her 
appreciation to L. Song Richardson, without whom this Note simply would not have been written. 
1. Letter from Aldrich Ames to Steven Aftergood (Nov. 28, 2000), http://www.fas.org/sgp/
othergov/polygraph/ames.html [https://perma.cc/38KS-4V87]. 
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On November 18, 2014, the federal government delivered a five-count 
indictment against former law enforcement officer Doug Williams.2 Williams had 
led the Oklahoma City Police Department’s Polygraph Section within the Internal 
Affairs Unit,3 and had also served as a communications advisor for two  
U.S. presidents.4 While his early career might have made him appear to be an ideal 
public servant, there was a twist: his time administering thousands of polygraph 
tests led him to believe that the tool was faulty. He left public service and embarked 
on a vocal campaign to bring down the federal government’s continued use of the 
technology in employment screening. Part of this campaign became a source of 
livelihood for Williams: he offered instruction to prospective employees on how to 
pass the lie detector test, regardless of whether or not they were planning on telling 
the full truth about their pasts.5 
After a two-day trial in June 2015, Williams pled guilty to all charges of mail 
fraud and witness tampering. He faced up to twenty years in prison and a $250,000 
fine, plus fees, for each count—100 years and more than one million dollars total—
for his actions.6 On September 23, 2015, a federal judge sentenced Williams to two 
years in prison.7 
Mainstream media largely ignored this Western District of Oklahoma trial and 
its outcome. This Note argues that this trial, however, should not be ignored. 
Rather, the Williams case highlights the shadowy, under-addressed system of 
modern pre-employment polygraph screening in America. A threshold question 
here is why Williams had a customer base to begin with: the polygraph is oftentimes 
the final step of a federal pre-employment screening process, and prospective 
employees, even those with nothing to hide, fear a false positive that would 
disqualify them. 
This Note hopes to begin a conversation that has been missing in the legal 
academy in recent years, namely whether the use of the polygraph for pre-
employment screening is necessary or justifiable. This void in the legal literature 
 
2. Indictment at 22, United States v. Williams, No. CR 14-318 M (W.D. Okla. Nov. 13, 2014). 
3. Deborah Carney, The “Lie Detector” is BS! And I Have Proved It! By Doug 




5. Christina Sterbenz, This Ex-Cop Thinks Lie-Detector Tests are so Inaccurate he’s Facing 
100 Years in Prison for Starting a Website that Taught People How to Cheat Them, BUSINESS 





7. Andrea Noble, Former Oklahoma City Cop Gets Two Years in Prison for Polygraph Coaching, 
THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/ 
23/douglas-williams-former-oklahoma-city-cop-gets-two/ [https://perma.cc/GSB7-RGPN]. 
Final to Printer_Rutbeck-Goldman (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:55 AM 
2017 ]  AN “UNFAIR AND CRUEL WEAPON” 717 
might reflect the incorrect assumption that polygraph use in this setting has declined 
or that its results have somehow become more accurate. Rather than focusing on 
the polygraph, recent legal scholarship has instead turned to functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and other new technological innovations, ignoring the 
reality that thousands of American workers continue to be turned away from 
employment prospects every year based on a screening tool developed in the 1800s.8 
I proceed in four parts. In Part I, I discuss Doug Williams’s prosecution and 
other similar cases to provide a backdrop for the services that Williams provided: 
namely, that there is a demand for lessons on how to beat the polygraph because of 
the use of the polygraph in pre-employment screening. 
Part II describes how the polygraph works and summarizes studies assessing 
its unreliability. This unreliability was an important reason why Congress passed the 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) in 1988, which prohibited use of the 
polygraph in private pre-employment screening. The federal government, however, 
not only exempted itself from the Act, but also expanded use of pre-employment 
polygraph testing to Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
Part III exposes the dangerous implications of using the polygraph for pre-
employment screening (or as a condition for ongoing employment) based on the 
technology’s unreliability. First, while there is no right to public employment, there 
is an invisible community of job candidates not receiving employment offers at the 
onset, or being terminated later on, because they fail this test—even if they are 
completely innocent of any past misdeeds or wrongdoing. A corollary to this 
problem of the “false positive” is the false negative: individuals who pose security 
threats still pass the polygraph. Additionally, individuals in this latter group may 
remain undetected because passing the polygraph potentially provides government 
agents in a supervisory role with a sense of complacency as to their screening 
apparatus, and they might thereafter relax otherwise stricter oversight throughout 
the course of an employee’s career.  
Part IV considers how, outside of the reliability-based concerns discussed 
above, use of the polygraph in employment settings implicates other civil rights 
concerns. First, social science research suggests that the invisible community of false 
positives might be comprised largely of racial minorities, a contrary result to certain 
federal agencies’ stated missions of diversity. Second, decades of social science 
research in the criminal justice context demonstrates that one’s past is not 
necessarily determinative of one’s future actions—but that even a conviction for a 
minor offense can inflict long-term, devastating impacts on an individual’s job 
search. Finally, the coercive setting of polygraph examinations should also cause 
concern, particularly about the potential for false confessions, which is clearly 
contrary to the stated purpose for using a polygraph in the first place. 
 
8. See, e.g., Leo Kittay, Admissibility of FRMI Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias Against  
“Mind Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351 (2007); Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell 
Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19  
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y L. 222 (2013). 
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I conclude by summarizing the major issue that Williams’s case brings up, but 
was not satisfactorily addressed during his trial or sentencing: as long as the 
polygraph is used by the federal government for pre-employment screening, 
individuals will seek out services such as those provided by Williams to prepare for 
this test. The result of this test is highly charged, as it often plays both judge and 
jury: a polygraph’s reading is likely the final word on an employee’s job prospects 
with no room for an explanation or alternate narrative. This is problematic because 
of how unreliable the polygraph is and also based on the fact that people posing 
serious security threats will be able to pass this test and enter employment. 
Furthermore, use of this test may have disparate racial impacts in agencies that are 
already struggling to diversify, and the production of false confessions is a 
noteworthy possibility. Use of the polygraph in pre-employment screening, 
therefore, has serious implications for those concerned with unfair employment 
practices; problems facing national security; disparate racial treatment; and other 
due process rights more generally. 
I. DOUG WILLIAMS’S CASE AND ITS PRECEDENTS 
Doug Williams was a successful businessman who considered himself a man 
on a mission. As part of his vocal criticism of the government’s use of the polygraph, 
Williams ran both AntiPolygraph.org and Polygraph.com. AntiPolygraph.org 
describes its mission as follows: 
AntiPolygraph.org seeks the complete abolishment of polygraph “testing” 
from the American workplace. Now that the National Academy of 
Sciences has conducted an exhaustive study and found polygraph screening 
to be invalid, and even dangerous to national security, Congress should 
extend the protections of the 1988 Employee Polygraph Protection Act to 
all Americans.9 
AntiPolygraph.org hosts a variety of toolkits, sets of information, and an 
online store. Its “Frequently Asked Questions” page includes basic questions about 
the polygraph (“How many questions are asked per series? How long is the spacing 
between questions?”); questions about abolishing the polygraph (“Why is 
AntiPolygraph.org dedicated to the abolishment of polygraph ‘testing?’”); and 
questions about rights for test-takers (“I recently took a polygraph ‘test,’ and failed, 
despite having told the truth on all questions. How could this have happened?”).10 
It also hosts a message board with action alerts along with the free electronic 
publication The Lie Behind the Lie Detector,11 currently in its fourth digital edition. 
 
9. Comprehensive Employee Polygraph Protection Act, ANTIPOLYGRAPH.ORG, https://
antipolygraph.org/ceppa.shtml [https://perma.cc/9JB5-YCS9] ( last visited Feb. 16, 2018) (emphasis 
omitted). 
10. Polygraph FAQ, ANTIPOLYGRAPH.ORG, https://antipolygraph.org/faq.shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/F7KT-3Q3Q] ( last visited Feb 16. 2018). 
11. George W. Maschke & Gino J. Scalabrini, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector ,  
ANTIPOLYGRAPH.ORG (4th ed. 2005), https://antipolygraph.org/lie-behind-the-lie- 
detector.pdf [https://perma.cc/KNS5-G7N3]; George Maschke, An Attempted Entrapment, 
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Williams has published various books, including How to Sting the Polygraph12 and 
From Cop to Crusader: My Fight against the Dangerous Myth of “Lie Detection.” 13 
Polygraph.com, which, at the time of this writing, is available in a drastically 
different form from its original,14 presented itself as more of a personal  
business than AntiPolygraph.org. As part of the website’s business model, Williams 
offered personal training sessions. According to the site, Williams’s training 
consisted of three elements: 1) “special training in my ‘enhanced mental imagery 
technique’ which utilizes a form of hypnosis . . . ; 2) three realistic practice 
polygraph tests . . . [and] 3) an evaluation of your polygraph charts . . . .”15 
This individualized training was the focus of the government’s sting operation. 
In its complaint describing this operation, the government alleged that Williams 
“did knowingly devise and intend to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud the 
Federal government, and to obtain money and property by means of materially false 
and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.”16 
While the government did not specifically point to where and how Williams 
perpetrated his scheme to defraud, it did describe in detail the undercover 
operations that led to the filing of charges. In the first case, for example, the agent 
informed Williams that he intended to lie to investigators about his involvement in 
an illegal operation. Williams backed away once he learned this information and 
 
ANTIPOLYGRAPH.ORG: ANTIPOLYGRAPH.ORG NEWS (Nov. 3, 2013, 1:34 PM), https://
antipolygraph.org/blog/2013/11/03/an-attempted-entrapment/ [https://perma.cc/3LVP398Y ]. 
George Maschke is the co-founder of AntiPolygraph.org. Maschke has been an outspoken critic of 
polygraphs as well and has documented what he has believed to be an attempted entrapment against 
him by the government. While the first four editions of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector were published 
between 2000 and 2005, there apparently have been no new editions since 2005.   
12. DOUG WILLIAMS, HOW TO STING THE POLYGRAPH (2014). How to Sting the Polygraph has 
been revised over fifty times. The abstract of the book on Amazon.com includes the following: 
KNOWLEDGE IS POWER - BUT FAILING TO PREPARE IS JUST PREPARING TO 
FAIL! As long as the polygraph is used to frighten and intimidate people - and as long as 
truthful people are falsely accused of lying, I will provide this information so they can protect 
themselves. If you are going to take a polygraph test, you MUST have the KNOWLEDGE 
you need to be PROPERLY PREPARED TO PASS YOUR POLYGRAPH TEST! I will 
teach you how to be PROPERLY PREPARED TO PASS - NERVOUS OR NOT - NO 
MATTER WHAT! The manual is short and easy to understand - it tells you everything you 
need to know to pass your polygraph test. The DVD demonstrates how well my technique 
works by showing you what it looks like on an actual polygraph chart when you do what I 
tell you to do. JUST TELLING THE TRUTH ONLY WORKS ABOUT 50% OF THE 
TIME - SO TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM BEING FALSELY ACCUSED OF 
LYING, YOU MUST LEARN HOW TO PASS! THE CHOICE IS YOURS - GET 
PREPARED OR GET SCREWED! 
Doug Williams, Abstract of How to Sting the Polygraph, AMAZON (Oct. 14, 2014), https://
www.amazon.com/How-Sting-Polygraph-Doug-Williams/dp/1502865874 [https://perma.cc/BJ99-
3TJQ ]. 
13. Doug Williams, FROM COP TO CRUSADER: MY FIGHT AGAINST THE DANGEROUS MYTH 
OF “LIE DETECTION” (2014), https://www.amazon.com/Cop-Crusader-against-dangerous-detection/ 
dp/1935689738 [https://perma.cc/Y5WY-66HU]. 
14. This website was drastically changed after the delivery of the guilty verdict in Williams’s case 
in May 2015. The Personal Training section of the site has since been removed. 
15. POLYGRAPH.COM ( Jan. 25, 2015) (archive of webpage on file with author). 
16. Indictment, supra note 2, at 4. 
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considered not training him at all. He ultimately, however, met with the agent and 
“train[ed ]  [him] how to conceal material lies and false statements during [the] 
investigation . . . .”17 Even if Williams’s actions here are considered to be extreme, 
the government presented no evidence that any of his other clients were so 
emphatically intent on (1) lying, and (2) ensuring that he knew they were planning 
on lying. This element—knowledge about the customer’s intent—is vital to the 
government’s case against Williams, but even in the drastic circumstances set up by 
the sting operation, Williams stated repeatedly that he was working under the 
assumption of truthfulness.18 
Nonetheless, after the indictment was filed, Williams clearly understood that 
he was in trouble. He proceeded to amend his publications accordingly. As one 
example, right before Williams went to trial in May 2015, Polygraph.com stated as 
a condition of training “I will not tell you to lie. I will not train you if you tell me 
you plan to lie. And I will not listen to any confessions or any admissions of 
wrongdoing whatsoever!”19 
The Obama administration had prosecuted identical behavior before. From 
2011–2012, the government pursued charges against Chad Dixon.20 Dixon, who 
was also charged under the mail fraud statute, owned and operated a small company 
called Polygraph Consultants of America. Unlike Doug Williams, Chad Dixon had 
no background in law enforcement. To the contrary, he was a little league coach 
who became involved with polygraph instruction when he could not find a job as 
an electrician to support his family. Dixon was actually inspired by Williams’s 
work.21 
According to the government’s complaint,  
[ I ]n addition to providing contact information for DIXON, [his] website 
promised prospective customers, “It makes no difference if your [sic] 
being truthful or bold face lying we will teach you how to produce truthfull 
[sic] charts guaranteed. Your personal instructor is an expert in teaching 
people just like you how to pass any polygraph exam. Equally important, 
there is no way anybody will be able to tell that you have been trained. The 
 
17. Id. at 11. 
18. Id. at 8. See also George Maschke, Comment to Feds Indict Another Person for Teaching People 
How to Beat Polygraph Tests, TECHDIRT ( Nov. 17, 2014, 1:35 PM ), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20141115/16013429160/feds-indict-another-person-teaching-people-how-to-beat-
polygraph-tests.shtml [https://perma.cc/XN6T-SRUT ]: “The only alleged crimes are those that the 
government itself orchestrated. Despite having seized all of Williams’ business records, including  
the names of thousands of customers, the indictment doesn’t allege any crime involving an actual 
customer. Instead the government had to engineer a crime for which to prosecute Williams.” 
19. Personal Training, supra note 15 (archive of webpage on file with author). 
20. Criminal Information at 8, United States v. Dixon, No. 1:12CR 521 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 
2012). 
21. Matt Zapotosky, Indiana Man Accused of Teaching People to Beat Lie Detector Tests Faces 
Prison Time, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/indiana-
man-accused-of-teaching-people-to-beat-lie-detector-tests-faces-prison-time/2013/08/31/a7cbe74a-
08ea-11e3-9941-6711ed662e71_story.html?utm_term=.03f9a9997fc7. 
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end result is the same every time, and that’s you passing your examination 
guaranteed!”22 
Similar to Williams, Dixon also was hired by an agent posing as a prospective 
Customs and Borders Protection (CBP) employee who was using drugs and had 
not disclosed this information on a preliminary examination.23 Furthermore, the 
agent claimed that he had previously accepted bribes to smuggle contraband to 
inmates.24 According to the complaint, Dixon “told [the agent] that if CBP learned 
of [the agent’s] undisclosed employment circumstances and resignation, [the agent] 
would not be hired by CBP.”25 Also similar to Williams, Dixon ultimately chose to 
enter a guilty plea, telling the judge he regretted his actions. He was sentenced to 
eight months in prison.26 
These prosecutions are a relatively recent phenomenon. The Obama 
administration, in the same vein as its overall crackdown on whistleblowers 
generally,27 dramatically changed the way that polygraph instructors had historically 
been treated: 
The federal government previously had treated such instructors only as 
nuisances, partly because the polygraph-beating techniques are unproven. 
Instructors have openly advertised and discussed their techniques online, 
in books and on national television. As many as 30 people or businesses 
across the country claim in Web advertisements that they can teach 
someone how to beat a polygraph test, according to U.S. government 
estimates.28 
In recent years, the federal government decided to change its approach and 
begin treating such instructors not as “nuisances” but rather as criminals. Part II 
describes the unreliability of the polygraph and its history in pre-employment 
screening in order to explain why these “criminals” had a ready customer base. 
 
22. Criminal Information, supra note 20, at 2 (alterations in original ). 
23. See id. at 8–9. 
24. Id. at 9. 
25. Id. at 10. 
26. Matthew Barakat, Chad Dixon Gets 8 Months for Teaching How to Beat Lie Detectors,  
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2013, 2:43 PM ), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/ 
09/06/chad-dixon-_n_3882052.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20130914051122/http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/06/chad-dixon-_n_3882052.html]. 
27. See, e.g., Tim Shorrock, Obama’s Crackdown on Whistleblowers, THE NATION ( Mar. 26, 
2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/obamas-crackdown-whistleblowers/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8X64-J8FK ]. 
28. Marisa Taylor, In Federal Crackdown, Ex-Cop Indicted for Coaching to Beat Polygraphs, 
MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU ( Nov. 14, 2014, 5:44 PM ), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
news/nation-world/national/national-security/article24776317.html [https://perma.cc/MS75-
2QFL]. While the prosecutions discussed in this article can be seen as in and of themselves concessions 
that countermeasures do work and therefore should not just be treated as nuisances, they also can and 
should be viewed as concessions that polygraphs themselves do not work—since the two logically 
operate hand in hand. 
Final to Printer_Rutbeck-Goldman (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:55 AM 
722 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:715 
II. BACKGROUND OF POLYGRAPH TECHNOLOGY AND ITS USE IN EMPLOYMENT 
To understand why Williams and Dixon’s customers sought them out in the 
first place, one must first understand a bit about how the polygraph works and its 
shifting role in pre-employment screening. After a brief overview of the history and 
workings of the technology itself, this Part summarizes the literature about the 
polygraph’s unreliability and connects this literature to the motivation behind 
Congress’s 1988 passage of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. Shedding 
doubt on the rationales for the federal government’s exemption from this Act, this 
Part then describes the most recent and drastic expansion of polygraph use in 
Customs and Border Protection to queue up questions about the Act’s 
effectiveness. 
A. Polygraph Background and Basics 
Ever since the dawn of the modern-day polygraph in 1895,29 the test has 
spawned both innumerous cultural references30 and polarizing critiques.31 While the 
most common concern is about the test’s accuracy, other concerns include fears 
about juror abdication (the role of the juror becoming co-opted by machines) as 
well as concerns about civil rights infringements.32 Searching for a definition of a 
polygraph is in and of itself indicative of some of these concerns. For example, even 
describing the polygraph as a “lie detection test” is subject to criticism. Some find 
it more accurately described as a “fear detector”33 or, more generally, an emotion-
detecting test.34 
 
29. One of the earliest examples of polygraph technology comes from Italy when, in 1895, 
Cesare Lombroso published a description of his blood monitoring experiments with criminals. 
Lombroso would fit a rubber glove to a tank of water and insert the suspect’s hand. Changes in the 
water’s height were thought to correspond to changes in the hand’s blood volume while lying. See  
James R. Wygant, Uses, Techniques, and Reliability of Polygraph Testing, 42 AM. JUR. TRIALS 313 § 
5 (1991). For a more general description of a variety of “truth verifiers” from ancient to modern times, 
see Richard H. Underwood, Truth Verifiers: From the Hot Iron to the Lie Detector, 84 KY. L.J. 597 
(1996). Underwood also specifically traces the modern-day American history of the polygraph. 
30. See The Truth About Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph Tests), AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Aug. 5, 
2004), http://www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180126165122/http://www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph.aspx] [hereinafter “APA Report”] 
(“Lie detector tests have become a popular cultural icon — from crime dramas to comedies to 
advertisements — the picture of a polygraph pen wildly gyrating on a moving chart is readily recognized 
symbol.”). 
31. See, e.g., Wygant, supra note 29, at § 2 (“Polygraph testing has often been regarded either 
with mystical reverence or as though it were the work of the devil.”). 
32. Id. 
33. See APA Report, supra note 30 (“A particular problem is that polygraph research has not 
separated placebo-like effects (the subject’s belief in the efficacy of the procedure) from the actual 
relationship between deception and their physiological responses. One reason that polygraph tests 
may appear to be accurate is that subjects who believe that the test works and that they can be detected 
may confess or will be very anxious when questioned. If this view is correct, the lie detector might be 
better called a fear detector.”). 
34. Underwood, supra note 29, at 14. 
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It is important to note from the outset that “[s]ome confusion about 
polygraph test accuracy arises because [polygraph tests] are used for different 
purposes, and for each context somewhat different theory and research is 
applicable.”35 Within the criminal justice system, for example, the result of 
polygraph tests might be sought in the pre-trial phase; during the trial itself; and 
after sentencing, such as by probation officers. Outside of the criminal justice 
context, and with limitations described infra, the result of a polygraph test might be 
sought after by prospective employers, to screen potential applicants, as an ongoing 
condition of employment, or both. 
Of these various contexts, the pre-employment polygraph test is perhaps the 
most controversial use of this device. Its proponents contend that it is “an 
inexpensive method of verifying employee truthfulness,” and its opponents claim 
that human dignity and individual rights are lost in this quest.36 Virtually “no 
research assesses the type of test and procedure used to screen individuals for jobs 
and security clearances.”37 This lack of field research led the National Resource 
Council (NRC), which compiled a comprehensive report of polygraph technology 
in 2003, to conclude that agencies seeking to use polygraph testing for employee 
security screening face “an unacceptable choice” between “too many loyal 
employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left 
undetected.”38 
The types of questions asked in a polygraph test vary by context. The “specific 
incident test” is administered to solicit information about a particular event, such as 
after an on-premises test. This type of test has been the subject of better-tested 
scientific techniques. The NRC’s 2003 report compiled fifty-seven studies that met 
the Committee’s quality criteria.39 From these studies, the Council concluded that 
specific incident tests can “discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above 
chance, though well below perfection.”40 In contrast, for pre-employment 
screening, the questions must be generic because there is no specific event being 
investigated.41 As a consequence, both examiner and examinee might have trouble 
determining what is considered lying unless very clear criteria are laid out. 
 
35. APA Report, supra note 30. 
36. See Validity and Construction of Statute Prohibiting Employers from Suggesting or Requiring 
Polygraph or Similar Tests as Condition of Employment or Continued Employment, 23 A.L.R.4TH 187, 
2 (1983). 
37. APA Report, supra note 30. See also COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
ON THE POLYGRAPH, NATIONAL RESOURCE COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 3 
(2003), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10420/the-polygraph-and-lie-detection [https://perma.cc/ 
JG5M-TFSF ]  [hereinafter NRC Report] (“Only one field study, which is flawed, provides evidence 
directly relevant to [. . .] preemployment screening.”). 
38. NRC Report, supra note 37, at 219. 
39. Id. at 3. 
40. Id. at 214. 
41. See id. at 1. 
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The exact polygraph test itself also varies based on the purpose of the 
investigation.42 However, across the board, the test analyzes physiological responses 
to a structured, but unstandardized, series of questions”43 to measure deception. 
The polygraph typically tests three indicators of autonomic arousal: heart rate/
blood pressure; respiration; and skin conductivity (also known as “electrodermal 
response”).44 A polygraph examiner asks a series of yes/no questions to the 
examinee who is connected to sensors that transmit data on these physiological 
phenomena. Polygraph instruments write on chart paper under ink pens at a rate of 
six inches per minute. 
The test itself works by comparing physiological measures when answering 
control questions to answering “relevant” questions.45 A pattern of greater 
physiological response to relevant questions leads to a finding of deception. 
However, as will be discussed below, an examiner’s analysis of these physiological 
responses does not take into account a subject’s natural reactions to fear, 
anticipation, or anxiety generally. 
In terms of the test’s credentials, the American Polygraph Association (APA) 
has set forth basic requirements for an APA-certified program. These include a 
minimum of 400 hours of in-person training conducted at a certified training facility 
that must be completed in ten to seventeen weeks, with ninety-five percent of 
instruction performed in the presence of a qualified faculty member.46 Materials 
include test formats, questions, and the psychological and physiological 
underpinnings of polygraph testing. The APA sponsors weeklong seminars every 
 
42. For example, the most widely used test in incident investigations is the Control Question 
Test (CQT), which compares responses to “relevant” questions (e.g. “did you shoot your wife?”) with 
those of “control” questions. Control questions concern misdeeds that are similar to those being 
investigated, but refer to the subject’s past and are usually broad in scope; for example, “Have you ever 
betrayed anyone who trusted you?” Id. at 14, 23. Other types of test include the Guilty Knowledge Test 
(GKT), the Test for Espionage and Sabotage (TES), and others. Id. at 161, 260. Presently, there are 
basically two types of polygraph examinations used in the security clearance process today: (1) the 
Counterintelligence Polygraph examination (CI Polygraph), id. at 259, and (2) the Lifestyle Examination 
( Lifestyle Polygraph), see id. at 263. 
43. APA Report, supra note 30. 
44. Id. (“Most examiners today use computerized recording systems. Rate and depth of 
respiration are measured by pneumographs wrapped around a subject’s chest. Cardiovascular activity is 
assessed by a blood pressure cuff. Skin conductivity (called the galvanic skin or electrodermal response) 
is measured through electrodes attached to a subject’s fingertips.”) See also Veazey v. Commc’ns & 
Cable of Chi., Inc., 194 F.3d 850, 854 n.3 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing the three principal components of 
the modern-day polygraph test). 
45. Test formats include the Keeler relevant question test, the Reid control question test, the 
Backster time limit controls, and the Baxter zone comparison test. See Wygant, supra note 29, at 66–71. 
46. American Polygraph Association, APA Accredited Polygraph Programs, POLYGRAPH.ORG, 
http://www.polygraph.org/apa-accredited-polygraph-training-programs [https://perma.cc/Q24A-
JSVX] ( last visited Feb. 16, 2018) (requirements include “a minimum of 400 hours that will be 
completed in not fewer than 10 nor more than 17 weeks and must be conducted at a qualified education 
and training facility; a week shall consist of at least four but not more than six consecutive days; a day 
is defined as at least six but not more than nine hours, excluding lunch and breaks; at least 95% of the 
instruction hours provided each week shall be done so in the presence of a faculty member qualified 
to provide such instruction”). 
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year for continuing education. Despite these certification measures, however, only 
about half of the states require a license to conduct examinations.47 
This variability amongst states’ requirements is only one type of variability that 
the use of a polygraph brings up. The next Part describes how and why the test’s 
results are unreliable generally, and describes the variability in how how lawmakers 
across states and the federal government have historically responded to this 
problem. 
B. Banning the Test for Employment Screening 
Polygraphs continue to be used in employment screening, despite the lack of 
scientific consensus about their reliability. Congress was well aware of this lack of 
scientific consensus when it passed the Employee Polygraph Protection Act in 
1988, but it still exempted itself from the Act’s obligations.48 While the reasons for 
Congress’s exemption seem to constitute a deferential approach to national security 
jurisdiction, this exemption undermines the Act’s effectiveness and casts doubt on 
the government’s patchwork policy regime in place regarding the polygraph’s 
continued use. Finally, the recent expansion of polygraph use to the CBP can serve 
as a case study in which, even accepting arguendo that polygraph use might be 
successful in screening out potentially-hazardous and imprudent employees, the 
other considerations that this Note addresses still weigh against its use in this area. 
1. Background of the Ban: Unreliability 
The polygraph has enjoyed a shaky role in American crime-solving, and every 
generation of lawmakers and agency heads has grappled with it. For example: 
In 1938, when lie detector tests administered in a murder-kidnapping case 
in Florida “proved” an innocent man was guilty, and “cleared” the person 
who later confessed, J.Edgar [sic] Hoover told his agents to “throw that 
box into Biscayne Bay.” Hoover completely banned “the box” from FBI 
investigations in 1964, but the Bureau brought it back and established a 
Polygraph Unit in 1978.49 
Courts have debated the use of polygraph evidence for about a century. For 
example, the famous Frye standard for assessing validity of evidence in a trial takes 
its name from a case in which an early form of the polygraph was rejected as a device 
to measure truth-telling.50 
 
47. Polygraph Issues & Warnings, THEPOLYGRAPHEXAMINER.COM, http://thepolygraph 
examiner.com/polygraph_schools.htm [https://perma.cc/844F-B8QH] ( last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
48. United States Department of Labor, Other Workplace Standards: Lie Detector Tests, ELAWS–
EMPLOYMENT LAW GUIDE, https://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/eppa.htm#who [https:// 
perma.cc/JRW5-THFA] ( last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
49. Underwood, supra note 29, at 628 (footnotes omitted).  Hoover’s “banning” of “the box” 
is not to be confused with “Ban the Box” campaigns, discussed infra at 120, 129.  
50. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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Numerous studies and reports have attacked the credibility of polygraphs, far 
too many to quote at length here. As the United States Supreme Court described in 
U.S. v. Scheffer, which held that a military rule banning polygraph evidence was not 
unconstitutional: 
Some studies have concluded that polygraph tests overall are accurate and 
reliable. . . . Others have found that polygraph tests assess truthfulness 
significantly less accurately — that scientific field studies suggest the 
accuracy rate of the “control question technique” polygraph is “little better 
than could be obtained by the toss of a coin,” that is, 50 percent.51 
Despite inconsistent study results and divergent opinions about the reliability 
of the polygraph, researchers agree that polygraph accuracy varies based on its 
decision threshold—that is, whether its main function is set at rooting out high 
security threats or protecting loyal employees.52 No matter the decision threshold, 
however, in all of the lab tests that the NRC ran, there were many false positives 
and still undetected security threats.53 The NRC also recognized that these lab rates 
were more accurate than actual field detection rates.54 Lab studies, in other words, 
“suffer from lack of realism” because “the consequences associated with lying or 
being judged deceptive almost never mirror the seriousness of these actions in real-
world settings in which the polygraph is used.”55 Therefore, as discussed above, the 
actual “real-world” potential of using polygraphs to screen out spies or other threats 
to security has been described as “extremely low.”56 
2. The Federal Government’s Exemption in the EPPA 
It is largely because of this unreliability that the polygraph’s use in employment 
has been so controversial. Even before passage of the EPPA in 1988,57 the 
polygraph’s use in employment screening had faced harsh criticism. Prior  
to congressional debate, several states had already passed their own statutes  
banning its use in employment screening, and state courts often upheld challenges 
to these statutes. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, in deciding a First 
 
51. United States v. Scheffer, 520 U.S. 303, 310 (1998) (citations omitted). 
52. See NRC Report, supra note 37, at 180 (“With a procedure of any given level of accuracy, 
however, the only way to reduce the frequency of one kind of error is by adjusting the decision 
threshold—but doing this always increases the frequency of the other kind of error. Thus, it is possible 
to increase the proportion of guilty individuals caught by a polygraph test (i.e., to reduce the frequency 
of false negatives), but only by increasing the proportion of innocent individuals whom the test cannot 
distinguish from guilty ones (i.e., frequency of false positives).”). 
53. See id. at 186–190. 
54. Id. at 3. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 5 (“The proportion of spies, terrorists, and other major national security threats among 
the employees subject to polygraph testing in the DOE laboratories and similar federal sites presumably 
is extremely low. Screening in populations with very low rates of the target transgressions (e.g., less than 
1 in 1,000) requires diagnostics of extremely high accuracy, well beyond what can be expected from 
polygraph testing.”). 
57. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009 (1988). 
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Amendment challenge to Minnesota’s private-employment polygraph ban, found 
that the state had a number of legitimate interests for its statute. These included: 
[E]ncouraging the maintenance of a harmonious atmosphere in 
employment relationships which may be disturbed by the coercion to take 
a polygraph or similar examination; protecting an employee’s expectation 
of privacy which he or she may have if the questions put during these 
examinations are personal, private, or confidential; discouraging practices 
which demean or appear to demean the dignity of an individual employee 
in a significant way; protecting employees from adverse inferences drawn 
if they refuse to take these tests; and avoiding the coercive impact present 
in the solicitation.58 
As described above, the Minnesota Supreme Court focused on the coercive 
nature of the polygraph, the desire to maintain “harmonious relationships” in 
employment contexts, and other dignitary issues suffered by employees as rationales 
to uphold the state legislation. The court took only judicial notice of the lie 
detector’s unreliability as undermining the employer’s argument for permitting the 
polygraph test.59 In the U.S. Senate’s report before passing the EPPA, on the other 
hand, the Act’s motivating rationales—including primarily, the scientific evidence 
demonstrating the technology’s faults—are stated explicitly: 
The last decade has witnessed an explosive growth in “lie-detector” tests, 
particularly the polygraph test. Today over two million polygraph tests are 
administered annually. While the polygraph was originally developed as an 
adjunct to criminal investigations within the law enforcement community, 
the vast majority of tests today are used as a screening procedure in private 
sector employment. These screening tests, either preemployment or 
random post-employment, account for much of the recent increase in 
testing of employees, despite the growing consensus of the scientific 
community about the lack of scientific validity of these examinations. 
Testimony provided to the Committee by the American Medical 
Association concluded that the polygraph can provide evidence of 
deception or honesty in a percentage of people that is statistically only 
somewhat better than chance. Another witness calculated that a minimum 
of 400,000 honest workers are wrongfully labeled deceptive, and suffer 
adverse employment consequences each year.60 
The Senate report, then, indicates that Congress was aware of the polygraph’s 
unreliability and the consequences of this unreliability in terms of the “adverse 
employment consequences” suffered by “honest workers.”61 After the Bill went 
through minor revisions in the House and the Senate, the EPPA was passed 
unanimously by all conferees. Its stated purpose is “[t]o prevent the denial of 
employment opportunities by prohibiting the use of lie detectors by employers 
 
58. State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 743 ( Minn. 1981). 
59. See id. at 743 n.13. 
60. S. REP. NO. 100-284, at 41 (1988). 
61. See id. 
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involved in or affecting interstate commerce.”62 The Act thus defines lie detectors 
broadly to include different kinds of voice technology, and forbids private sector 
employers from “directly or indirectly” requiring, requesting, suggesting, or causing 
prospective and current employees “to take or submit to any lie detector test,” or 
from using, accepting, referring to, or inquiring about the results of lie detector tests 
of employees or prospective employees.63 
The Act enumerates various remedies for a violation, including, but not limited 
to, civil penalties up to $10,000, and injunctive actions by the Secretary of Labor  
to restrain violations.64 The Act has been successfully used to fight various high-
level cases of employees who were discharged after refusing to submit to polygraph 
examinations.65 Despite these successes, however, the Act is “in fact, [ ] subject  
to a number of important statutory exemptions and limitations that impact 
significantly the availability of the use of lie detector tests in the employment area.”66 
This is probably a result of the deliberative process—that is, the bargaining  
and compromising that took place in passing this bill: Senator Orrin Hatch, one  
of the original Bill cosponsors, called it “a unique bill” and “an equitable 
compromise . . . which addresses both the interests of employees and the needs of 
employers.”67 
In terms of exemptions for private employers, the Act includes, for example, 
a “limited” exemption in the ban of polygraph use for ongoing investigations.68 If 
an employer has suffered an economic loss or injury in her business, the employer 
may request a polygraph test of the employee only when the employee had access 
to the property and the employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee was 
involved.69 The exemptions as a whole illustrate that the EPPA represents both 
legislative compromise and political bargaining, with Congress expressing deference 
toward the use of the polygraph in certain private sector scenarios. 
Aside from these carve-outs, however, the federal government broadly 
exempted itself from the law it was passing. Various members of Congress 
recognized this double standard. Georgia Representative George “Buddy” Darden, 
for example, found this curious: “[ I ]f this polygraph is such quackery or witchcraft, 
why do we not apply [the proposed law] fully across the board and give the same 
 
62. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 § 2001. 
63. Id. §§ 2001(3), 2002(1)–(2). 
64. Id. § 2005. 
65. See, e.g., Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 938 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the EPPA 
preempted New Jersey anti-polygraph statute and prohibited National Security Agency from 
discharging employee after she refused to submit to polygraph testing and had her security clearance 
revoked). But see Hossaini v. W. Mo. Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
hospital was political subdivision of county and therefore was exempt from the EPPA). 
66. Joseph M. Pellicciotti, The Employee Polygraph Act of 1988: A Focus on the Act’s Exemptions 
and Limitations, 51 LOY. L. REV. 911, 913 (2005) (describing rationales and legitimacy of the EPPA’s 
exemptions for ongoing investigation, drug security, and security services). 
67. 134 CONG. REC. 14,008 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
68. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)). 
69. See H.R. CONF. REP NO. 100-659, at 13 (1988). 
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protection to everyone that we are giving to those employees within the private 
sector?”70 
A quasi-answer to Representative Darden’s question can be indirectly located 
in the Bill’s legislative history. The House Report states: 
By exempting public sector employers and private contractors engaged in 
intelligence and counterintelligence functions, the conferees recognize the 
functions performed by these employers are not within the jurisdiction of 
the committees which reported the legislation, and the policy decisions as 
to the proper or improper use of such tests are left to the committees of 
jurisdiction and expertise.71 
It seems, then, that the Act’s exemptions for the intelligence and 
counterintelligence fields were based on concerns about jurisdiction and expertise. 
These concerns could potentially have been overridden, but it appears that the 
balance between “the interests of employees and the needs of employers” Senator 
Hatch described in extoling this Bill weighed in favor of deference to national 
security interests, even in 1986. Below, this Note posits that individuals posing 
serious security threats will still be able to pass a polygraph examination, rendering 
this explanation unsatisfying. However, the point here is that the government 
exempted itself from the EPPA based on a purported rationale of national security. 
We can imagine that today this Bill, ripe with exemptions as it is, might not 
even have passed due to the increasing uproar over “insider threats” in the realm of 
national security.72 Instead, polygraph use has apparently increased due to concerns 
about whistleblowers. For example, even though there is currently not publicly 
available information about Edward Snowden’s polygraph record, in the wake of 
Snowden’s defection from the National Security Agency (NSA), at least one article 
has reported that analysts have gone from being polygraphed once every five years 
to once every quarter.73 The polygraph’s use for continued federal employment, 
 
70. 134 Cong. Rec. 13,065 (1988) (statement of Rep. Darden). 
71. H.R. CONF. REP NO. 100-659, at 12. 
72. On October 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13587 –– Structural Reforms 
to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of 
Classified Information. This Executive Order established an Insider Threat Task Force, which includes 
the mandate to develop “a Government-wide policy for the deterrence, detection, and mitigation of 
insider threats.” Exec. Order No. 13,587, 76 Fed. Reg. 63811 (Oct. 7, 2011). The Insider Threat 
Program has been described as “an unprecedented government-wide crackdown under which millions 
of federal bureaucrats and contractors must watch out for ‘high-risk persons or behaviors’ among co-
workers.” Jonathan S. Landay & Marisa Taylor, Experts: Obama’s Plan to Predict Future Leakers 
Unproven, Unlikely to Work, MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU ( July 9, 2013, 3:25 PM), http:// 
www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/09/196211/linchpin-for-obamas-plan-to-predict.html#.UdyJ-
1Ocq_D [https://web.archive.org/web/20180207105335/http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/ 
special-reports/insider-threats/article24750850.html]; see also Conor Friedersdorf, Obama’s ‘Insider 
Threat Program’: A Parody of Liberal Faith in Bureaucrats, THE ATLANTIC ( Jul. 10, 2013), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/obamas-insider-threat-program-a-parody-of-liberal-
faith-in-bureaucrats/277653/ [https://perma.cc/29B3-XA5T]. 
73. Daniel Drezner, Tone-Deaf at the Listening Post: My Day at the National Security  
Agency Headquarters at Fort Meade, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 16, 2013, 8:39 PM ), http:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/16/tone-deaf-at-the-listening-post/ [https://perma.cc/ZZV4-CAG5]. 
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then, is still being justified by a notion that it enhances national security, without 
any evidence in support. 
This, of course, is not the first or only time that the government has exempted 
itself from a law. The voluminous record of tax exemptions for government-owned 
property, as just one example, bears testament to this.74 However, it seems strange 
that the government would have exempted itself in this case while concurrently 
promoting a policy choice based on the unreliability of the polygraph: even the 
stated importance of national security cannot make a polygraph more reliable. 
Furthermore, if another motivator of the Act was fear of misuse (specifically, 
overuse) by private agencies, why is the government exempt from this potential 
misuse? These questions underlie a discussion of dangerous implications in using 
polygraph examinations for pre-employment screening. 
3. Specific Issues in Expansion to CBP 
Despite the questionable accuracy of polygraph tests described above, 
Congress voted in 2010 to expand the government’s use of these tests to Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP).75 This expansion, however, should not be thought of 
as simply a quantitative expansion of the number of federal employees subjected 
to polygraph testing, but rather also as a qualitative shift in use of the technology. 
The use here, in other words, differs in material ways from the rationales for the 
exemptions as outlined in the EPPA. 
The only carve-outs to the EPPA’s prohibition in private employment are, 
supposedly, for jobs involving access to top secret or special access program 
information: “The conference agreement is designed to conform with the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (H.R. 1748), which 
restricts such testing to individuals whose duties involve access to top secret or 
special access program information.”76 As described above, the polygraph has been 
found to not provide an “acceptable” level of assurance to actually justify these 
rationales in and of themselves, but the point here is that the exceptions, at least, 
are limited. 
The 2010 bill expanding polygraph testing, on the other hand, did not have 
these similar rationales in mind, but rather made the findings of “corruption” and 
“improper conduct” (instead of security threats) as motivators.77 The Anti-Border 
Corruption Act, signed into law by President Obama in 2011,78 found that “since 
 
74. See, e.g., Sales Tax Exemption, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/ofm/
tax/sales/#c [https://perma.cc/3VNA-PMHA] ( last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
75. See Maschke & Scalabrini, supra note 11, at 33 (“While in 1988, Congress ratified and 
President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) prohibiting 
most polygraph screening in the private sector, the Act expressly exempted federal, state, and local 
government. In the years since the OTA report, the reliance of Government on polygraphy has grown, 
rather than diminished, even as numerous spies have beaten the polygraph.”). 
76. H.R. CONF. REP NO. 100-659, at 12. 
77. See Anti-Border Corruption Act, Pub. L. No. 111-376, 124 Stat. 4104 (2011). 
78. See id. 
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2003, 129 U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials have been arrested on 
corruption charges and, during 2009, 576 investigations were opened on allegations 
of improper conduct by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials.”79 Congress 
also found that CBP already had a polygraph testing regime in place, but that the 
requirement was being under-enforced, creating a major backlog.80 
The CBP website describes the test as a “standardized polygraph exam,” the 
results of which “will be used in determining your suitability for employment with 
CBP”: 
Some questions will concern the answers you gave on your application 
forms; others will deal with national security issues (e.g., foreign contacts, 
mishandling of classified information, and involvement in terrorist 
activity). All questions will be explained and reviewed with you prior to the 
actual examination. You will be given an opportunity to discuss any 
concerns or issues you may have about any question prior to the actual 
exam.81 
The key word here is a prospective employee’s suitability for employment with 
the CBP. While an argument can be made that corruption in CBP is, indeed, a matter 
of national security (and that the expansion did not, then, qualitatively change or 
expand the EPPA’s exemptions), the CBP’s own internal categorization undercuts 
this argument. As the website itself describes, “suitability” and “security” are two 
different processes.82 Suitability is the underlying one-size-fits-all pre-employment 
screening that all employees must pass: “an individual’s identifiable character traits 
and conduct that is sufficient to decide whether the individual’s employment or 
continued employment would or would not protect the integrity or promote the 
efficiency of the service.”83 Security, on the other hand, involves clearances to work 
with top-secret programs and information: in other words, exactly the rationales 
 
79. Id. 
80. See id. The Trump administration has further de-prioritized punishing CBP applicants  
for “past misdeeds.” By requesting 5,000 new CBP officers, President Trump has led CBP to  
consider waiving lie detector tests for applicants, two thirds of whom fail tests on a yearly basis.. Border 
Patrol May Loosen Lie-Detector Use in Hiring to Meet Trump’s Jobs Order, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2017, 
6:37 PM ), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/08/border-patrol-lie-detector-test-
new-hires-trump-jobs-order [https://perma.cc/T7B8-9TFD] (describing, also, that as of March 
2017, CBP was considering “a six-month experiment with an alternative polygraph test that takes less 
time to administer”).  That consideration has led to legislation allowing for this change in policy; such 
a measure has so far passed the House.  See Maria Sacchetti, House Passes Bill to Allow Some Border  
and Customs Job Applicants to Skip Polygraph Test, WASHINGTON POST ( June 7, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/house-passes-bill-to-allow-some-border-and-customs-
job-applicants-to-skip-polygraph-test/2017/06/07/59b2a9b8-4b99-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_ 
story.html?utm_term=.6ce2fbbe43ed (describing the new bill, which would permit the CBP 
commissioner to waive the polygraph requirement for full-time state or local law enforcement officers 
who have passed the test in the past 10 years). 
81. Background Investigation Process and Polygraph Examination FAQs, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 
BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/careers/car/poly ( last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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promoted by the EPPA’s already-existing private sector exceptions.84 The use of 
the polygraph for CBP, then, is functioning very differently from how Congress 
envisioned polygraph use in the EPPA. 
The consequences of the CBP screening exams have also functioned in 
accordance with a different set of standards. The screening exams have resulted in 
hundreds of prospective agents being turned away from these jobs.85 Indeed, some 
of the applicants’ histories can read like a parade of horribles. One article, for 
example, found CBP agents who had disclosed a wide variety of crimes, including 
bestiality, sexual molestation, and involvement in a hit-and-run.86 
One might, understandably, be viscerally appalled by these crimes. As a result, 
one might conclude that this is exactly why the requirement for polygraph testing 
is, and should be, in place. One might even be tempted to advocate for more 
widespread pre-screening use of the polygraph based on these past bad deeds. 
However, even if, arguendo, there was an empirically higher rate of criminality 
amongst CBP agents than other federal agents and the general population, and even 
if one believes that the consequences, therefore, of a polygraph test which detects 
these past crimes is normatively positive, there are still serious reasons for concern 
in the CBP’s expansion of polygraph testing, as just one case study of pre-
employment testing by the federal government. These additional reasons for 
concern are discussed below.  
III. DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS BASED ON UNRELIABILITY 
Using the polygraph for pre-employment screening, or as an ongoing 
condition of employment, raises several dangerous implications based on the 
 
84. Id. 
85. S. REP. NO. 111-338 (2010) makes a compelling case for the continued and even expanded 
use of applicant polygraph testing by CBP in the future as well:  
In 2009, less than 15 percent of applicants for CBP jobs received polygraph examinations. 
Significantly, CBP reported to Congress that of those applicants undergoing polygraph 
examinations, 60% were found ineligible for employment, primarily due to prior drug use or 
a criminal history that the applicant had not previously disclosed. Less than 1 percent  
of CBP applicants who successfully completed an applicant polygraph examination 
subsequently were disqualified in their required single scope background investigation 
(SSBI). By contrast, 22% of applicants who were not subjected to applicant polygraph 
testing were subsequently disqualified in their SSBI. Further, given that SSBI’s cost an 
average of $3,200, the expanded use of applicant polygraph testing offers a more cost-
effective and streamlined security process for CBP applicants. The numbers demonstrate 
that polygraph testing of applicants before the initiation of an SSBI has significant utility 
and offers a cheaper and faster method for effectively vetting candidates. 
Charles N. Painter, A Private Sector Polygraph Solution for the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 
2010, INSIDE HOMELAND SEC., http://www.abchs.com/ihs/SUMMER2012/ihs_articles_2.php 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20161226074126/http://www.abchs.com/ihs/SUMMER2012/ihs_ 
articles_2.php/] ( last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
86. Andrew Becker, During Polygraphs, Border Agency Applicants Admit to Rape, Kidnapping, 
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unreliability described above. First, anyone concerned about unfair employment 
practices should raise an eyebrow at the large number, but invisible nature, of 
employees who are falsely labeled “deceptive” by the polygraph on an annual basis: 
the “false positives.” This invisible community of false positives is particularly 
disconcerting since polygraph testing tends to have an adverse effect on the most 
truthful, conscientious employees that one might intentionally seek for high security 
positions. Conversely, the polygraph’s effectiveness is undercut by the fact of 
existing “false negatives,” those who pass the polygraph despite having a criminal 
record or posing a security risk. Research suggests that using the polygraph for 
employment purposes might lead to a sense of overconfidence on the part of the 
government, thereby relaxing other standards of screening and detecting actual 
security threats (such as spies). This concern about undue confidence also underlies 
Supreme Court decision-making concerning the role of polygraph evidence in the 
courtroom. For all these reasons, using the polygraph for pre-employment 
screening or as an ongoing condition of employment should be reconsidered. 
A. False Positives 
One inevitable outcome of using the unreliable polygraph for employment 
screening is the invisible community of false positives. While there is no court-
recognized right to public employment, the fact remains that there is a sizeable 
invisible community of people not receiving employment offers (with the 
government, at least) because they cannot pass this test but are not lying—
regardless of how broadly we might define lying.87 In the end, because of the way 
 
87. Nailing down the definition of a “lie” is a difficult task, and, for the most part, this task is 
outside the scope of this Note. It is both a philosophical and pragmatic inquiry: for example, many 
moral philosophers have studied the morality of lying. See Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie 
from Altruistic Motives, in CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 346, 347 (Lewis White Beck ed., 1949) (arguing that lying is a moral wrong because it 
undermines the dignity of others). This inquiry takes place in a wide variety of social and professional 
settings: psychologists might be concerned about the pathology of lying to better treat patients; social 
workers might be concerned about discerning the “truth” from a child; lawyers might be concerned 
about their client taking a seat on the witness stand under threat of perjury. For all of these professions 
and so many more, then, the line between a “lie” and a “non-lie” is crucial. See, e.g., Christopher 
Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2007) (“Deception is usually 
considered a bad thing. We teach our children not to lie, we don’t like it when our politicians dissemble, 
and we root against the television character who misleads people. But we also officially permit 
deception in all sorts of situations, including sports (Boise State’s statue of liberty play in the 2007 Fiesta 
Bowl), negotiations between lawyers (puffing about the client’s case), and scientific research (from 
whence the term ‘placebo’).”). Some philosophers engage in conceptual analysis to define “lie.” 
Professor Don Fallis, for example, defines lies as “when you assert something that you believe to be 
false.” Don Fallis, What is Lying?, 106 J. PHIL. 29, 33 (2009). It is easy to see that this broad definition, 
however, encompasses some sort of intent to deceive. In other words, if a person says something and 
does the opposite, she is not necessarily lying when she first made the statement. Lying, instead, 
involves an intentionality to bring about a certain behavior, or a certain reliance, in one’s subject. 
Even within this definition: 
It is probably more accurate to think of lies, collectively, as occupying positions on a nearly 
infinite gradient. That gradient, in turn, constitutes only a portion of a further, nearly infinite 
gradient necessary to locate the full variety of lies, false statements, fraudulent statements, 
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the EPPA was enacted, the FBI alone still polygraphs approximately 13,000 people 
a year for job screening, and as many as forty percent of special agent applicants do 
not get the job because of their polygraph test results.88 These numbers should be 
extremely disconcerting for anyone who cares about unfair employment practices 
since many people screened out are (1) innocent by any definition or (2) “guilty” of 
something—but that “something” likely does not relate to his or her essential job 
duties. 
As far as numbers within this “invisible community” are concerned, one study 
found that one in four applicants for police officer jobs were disqualified solely 
based on their polygraph results.89 Federal agencies report a similar failure rate. 
According to a 1997 letter submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee by Donald 
Kerr, then assistant director of the FBI’s Laboratory Division, twenty percent of 
the bureau’s job applicants who had passed an initial pre-employment polygraph 
examination were “determined to be withholding pertinent information” on lie 
detector tests. This problem does not affect pre-employment screening alone, but 
also affects screenings for continued employment. Indeed, the likelihood of 
receiving a deceptive test result at some point in an employee’s career increases 
when one is subjected to multiple polygraph examinations.90 The more times that 
one is subjected to a polygraph examination, the more opportunities one has for the 
machine to show a “deceptive” result even just one fatal time. This is particularly 
relevant (and harrowing) for NSA employees today in light of recent reports that 
the Agency has increased its polygraph testing of employees twentyfold in recent 
years.91 
In 2002, Mother Jones profiled a prospective Secret Service employee, Bill 
Roche, who had this exact experience of undergoing multiple polygraph 
examinations and failing just once.92 In an article appropriately entitled “Lie 
Detector Roulette,” a confident Mr. Roche, who made detective while in his 
 
misleading statements, deceptive statements, and perjurious or other related sorts of 
statements. 
R. George Wright, Lying and Freedom of Speech, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1131, 1132–33 (2011). 
88. Marisa Taylor, FBI Turns Away Many Applicants Who Fail Lie-Detector Tests, MCCLATCHY 
DC BUREAU (May 20, 2013, 12:00 AM ), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/special-reports/
article24749254.html [https://perma.cc/TK48-MSZ4]. Even more pertinent to this Note, a 2016 
article reports that the FBI has been not only looking at failed polygraph results, but also looking for 
examinees who are allegedly making use of countermeasures.  Jessica Schulberg, The FBI Insists It 
Doesn’t Fire People over Polygraphs.  This Man Says It Happened to Him., HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 
2016, 10:00 PM ), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fbi-polygraphs-countermeasures_us_ 
57ffe22ce4b0162c043ae621 [https://perma.cc/S62R-SYTF] (noting that “[ i ]nstead of disciplining 
employees for failing polygraphs, the FBI can accuse them of using countermeasures and punish them 
for that”). 
89. See Brendan I. Koerner, Lie Detector Roulette, MOTHER JONES ( Nov. 1, 2002, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2002/11/lie-detector-roulette [https://perma.cc/93AU-
UQ8S]. 
90. See Maschke & Scalabrini, supra note 11, at 38. 
91. Drezner, supra note 73. 
92. Koerner, supra note 89. 
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twenties in a suburban Bay Area police department, describes his application 
process to become a U.S. Secret Service Agent.93 When he initially applied, “his 
interviewers lauded him as an excellent candidate.”94 He needed only to pass the 
polygraph, and this detail did not deter him or even cause him to be fearful: He had 
taken many tests while he was a police officer. 
During the actual test, which took seven hours, the polygraph examiner 
continuously yelled at him and told him that his reactions were “not in the 
acceptable range.” Mr. Roche reported that the more fervently he protested his 
innocence, the more confrontational the examiner became. Ultimately, his results 
were labeled “deceptive” and the Agency bounced him from the applicant pool.95 
Williams’s site, AntiPolygraph.org, includes many similar personal statements 
from special agents. One story is especially telling, since the Agent had originally 
began working for the FBI in 1994 when pre-employment polygraph testing was 
not used.96 “Agent Smith,” whose name was changed for inclusion on the site, 
successfully completed training and worked as a field agent in a large field office 
for a “number of years” before leaving to pursue other job opportunities. After a 
few years, he decided he wanted to return to work with the FBI, and applied for re-
instatement. By this time, the FBI had begun implementing polygraph tests. The 
offer to return to work as a special agent was contingent upon his successful passing 
of the polygraph that was in place, by that point, for first-time applicants. He did 
not pass, and also failed a retest opportunity. Agent Smith then wrote four letters 
to various assistant directors, explaining that his anxiety over returning to work with 
the FBI, and his own understanding of the machine’s variability, led to the 
“deceptive” result. His letters articulate one of the major concerns at issue in this 
sort of testing: 
I told the truth during the polygraph exam. How can I prove it? How can 
I prove I did not lie? In many ways this situation is worse than being 
accused of a crime. If I were accused of a crime I would at least have a 
chance to face my accuser, present evidence and be judged by a jury of my 
peers. This is not the case with a polygraph. The machine is the accuser, 
the judge and the jury . . . .97 
Bill Roche and Agent Smith represent a larger, invisible community. This 
community is invisible because, at its most basic level, the public does not have an 
accurate count of how many people are being screened out of federal employment 
prospects. Additionally, even if the public had access to that denominator 
(individuals screened out of employment prospects annually based on a polygraph 





96. Polygraph Statement of Special Agent Smith, ANTIPOLYGRAPH.ORG, https://antipolygraph.org/
statements/statement-001.shtml [https://perma.cc/MST2-Z7GH] ( last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
97. Id. (alteration in original). 
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“innocent” (i.e. based on any definition of lying) or somewhere in the middle  
(i.e. perhaps omitting something from their lives, which may or may not be directly 
addressed by the question at hand).98   
Additionally, as the NRC report points out, the public does not have an 
accurate count of how many competent individuals have been deterred from even 
applying for high-security positions because of the possibility of false positives: 
“[Overconfidence in polygraph testing] can lead to unnecessary loss of competent 
or highly skilled individuals because of suspicions cast on them as a result of false 
positive polygraph exams or because they avoid or leave employment in federal 
security organizations in the face of such prospects.”99 In other words, there might 
be a deterrent effect at the front-end of employment: prospective employees who 
will avoid seeking out certain jobs solely because of the prospect of taking a 
polygraph examination. 
This “invisible community” of false positives is particularly disconcerting 
since this demographic is comprised of exactly who one might want in powerful 
positions: truthful, conscientious people. The more conscientious one feels about 
being found guilty, the higher the likelihood that he or she will register a “deceptive” 
test result on a polygraph examination. The NRC report states that “there is 
evidence suggesting that . . . truthful examinees who are believed to be guilty or 
believed to have a high likelihood of being guilty may show emotional and 
physiological responses in polygraph test situations that mimic the responses that 
are expected of deceptive individuals.”100 Accordingly, the federal government is 
missing out on the assets, ideas, and contributions of truthful employees based on 
its reliance on polygraph technology. This reliance, furthermore, is not simply 
misplaced: it might also be actually dangerous because of the ensuing potential for 
overconfidence in pre-screening strategies, described below. 
B. Overconfidence 
The general concept of overconfidence is related to the idea of false negatives. 
Put simply, there are bound to be people who appear non-deceptive on an initial 
polygraph test, and then further background screenings or alternative methods of 
ensuring security are not carried out fully. The NRC report describes potential 
consequences of overconfidence in terms of the “false sense of security” promoted 
by the polygraph use: 
Such overconfidence, when it affects counterintelligence and security 
policy choices, may create an unfounded, false sense that because 
employees have appeared nondeceptive on a polygraph, security precautions 
can be relaxed. Such overconfidence can create a false sense of security 
among policy makers, employees in sensitive positions, and the public that 
 
98. See R. George Wright, supra note 87 (describing the “nearly infinite gradient” of lies). Data, 
clearly, is hard to gather, in part based on the difficulty in defining this “nearly infinite gradient.”   
99. See NRC Report, supra note 37, at 220 (emphasis added). 
100. Id. at 3. 
Final to Printer_Rutbeck-Goldman (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:55 AM 
2017 ]  AN “UNFAIR AND CRUEL WEAPON” 737 
may in turn lead to inappropriate relaxation of other methods of ensuring security. 
It can waste public resources by devoting to the polygraph funds that 
would be better expended on developing or implementing alternative 
security procedures.101 
Overconfidence can be illuminated with real cases, and the case of Aldrich 
Ames should be considered an exemplar. Ames was a CIA counter-intelligence 
officer who was charged with spying for the Soviet Union and, later, Russia. He had 
passed two CIA polygraph examinations between 1985 and 1994, in which he 
denied having committed espionage. One of these examinations, for example, did 
not yield any suspicious information about large cash transactions after he returned 
from his post abroad, including but not limited to a half million dollar cash deposit 
on a home.102 It was only when the FBI utilized both electronic and physical 
surveillance that Ames and his wife pled guilty to being the mole that the FBI had 
been searching for. At this point, the investigation had been ongoing for nine years. 
The results of Ames’s actions were “potentially devastating to the national security 
of the United States”: 
By turning over thousands of classified documents to the Soviets, Ames 
managed to shut down any effective intelligence gathering within the 
Soviet Union and Russia for almost a decade. Coupled with the espionage 
of the Walker family spy ring and another CIA employee, Edward Lee 
Howard, the United States intelligence community provided the national 
command authority little human intelligence about the Soviet Union or 
Russia. The results were potentially devastating to the national security of 
the United States.103 
Ames’s record with the clandestine unit of the FBI had been anything but 
perfect. He slept on the job, was “inattentive to security,” (even, one time, leaving 
highly classified documents on a subway in New York), and was “derelict in filing 
required reports” in multiple subject areas.104 However, “[ l ]ittle attention or 
corrective action was taken during his entire career.”105 The fact that Ames passed 
these polygraph tests while he was on the FBI’s suspect list led to a relaxation of 
suspicion about him and a redirection to other suspects, which further prolonged 
 
101. Id. at 219–20 (emphasis added). See also Pellicciotti, supra note 66, at 941(“Overconfidence 
can be brought about by the ready availability and use of lie detector testing and the potential that such 
ready use will result in undue over reliance on the part of agency officials. An undue over reliance on 
the use of lie detector testing can take the government’s focus off of more effective security measures, 
and it can inefficiently allocate resources to activities where they are least effective and deny resources 
where they would be best used to enhance legitimate governmental functions.”). 
102. David M. Crane, Divided We Stand: Counterintelligence Coordination Within the Intelligence 
Community of the United States, 1995-DEC ARMY LAW. 26, 29 (1995). 
103. Id. at 27. In the wake of Ames’s conviction, the polygraph community heatedly debated 
whether or not his charts did, indeed, reveal deception or whether this was an inevitable consequence 
of unreliable technology.  See Maschke & Scalabrini, supra note 11, at 36. This debate over whether or 
not the charts revealed deception, however, simply illustrates the subjective nature of reading polygraph 
charts 
104. Crane, supra note 102, at 27. 
105. Id. 
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the investigation. Even the CIA inspector general admitted, at the end of the 
investigation, “It is true that the spy was found, but the course to that conclusion 
could have been much more rapid and direct.”106 
The Ames case is just one illustration of the fact that major security risks will 
still invariably remain undetected even with use of the most secure screening 
processes, and these security risks will invariably be able to pass “routine” as well as 
specific incident polygraph examinations. The community of scientists and 
statisticians who authored the comprehensive 2003 NRC Report was keenly aware 
of this proposition, and called upon it in declaring that polygraph testing for pre-
employment screening led to an “unacceptable choice” between “too many loyal 
employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left 
undetected.”107 
Case dicta is informative about a different aspect of overconfidence. Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion in Scheffer describes some of the considerations that a 
state would contemplate when deciding whether or not to allow polygraph evidence 
in the courtroom: 
Jurisdictions, in promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be 
concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive weight to the 
opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise and at 
times offering, as in respondent’s case, a conclusion about the ultimate 
issue in the trial. Such jurisdictions may legitimately determine that the aura 
of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to abandon 
their duty to assess credibility and guilt.108 
In other words, use of the polygraph in a courtroom can lead jurors to be 
overconfident in the results of the polygraph, and thus, to forsake their duties 
toward careful, unbiased consideration of other evidence. Furthermore, neither the 
judge nor the jury is likely to know about the accuracy and validity of a specific 
polygraph test administered in a particular situation, so courts “are wise to be 
reticent in allowing a ‘black box’ to replace the judgment of the trier of fact in such 
circumstances.”109 This argument was one of the strongest rationales for Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion in Scheffer. 
It is worth noting that Justice Thomas’s majority opinion distinguishes the use 
of polygraph evidence in a criminal courtroom from polygraph evidence in pre-
employment screening, writing that “[s]uch limited, out of court uses of polygraph 
techniques obviously differ in character from, and carry less severe consequences 
than, the use of polygraphs as evidence in a criminal trial.”110 It is not clear, however, 
 
106. Id. at 28. CIA Inspector General Frederick P. Hitz here was likely speaking about the lack 
of coordination between agencies, but this statement can be applied to various aspects of the faulty 
Ames investigation in general. 
107. See NRC Report, supra note 37, at 6. 
108. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313–14 (1998). 
109. Stephen E. Fienberg, To Tell the Truth: On the Probative Value of Polygraph Search 
Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 107, 116 (2005). 
110. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 312 n.8. 
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that out of court uses obviously differ in character from use in a criminal trial: First, 
as described below, the test—even in the pre-employment context—has been used 
as an interrogation device, which carries potential criminal ramifications for 
disclosures. The role of the polygraph in these two contexts (pre-employment and 
criminal trials), then, might be more similar than what Justice Thomas assumed in 
Scheffer. As Agent Smith described in his anecdote on Polygraph.com, the 
polygrapher in pre-employment settings plays both judge and jury.111 There is no 
concomitant trial to elicit further evidence, weigh credibility, and arrive at a different 
verdict. In the pre-employment setting, the polygraph’s result is the verdict. 
Second, the consequences of pre-employment polygraph use might actually be 
more similar to the consequences of a criminal proceeding than Justice Thomas 
assumed. Both a “deceptive” polygraph result and a criminal sentence can carry 
long-term consequences, some of which are difficult to quantify. Is a defendant who 
faces, say, six months of probation for a misdemeanor marijuana offense necessarily 
worse-off than a thirty-year government employee whose lie detection test is found 
to be “deceptive” right before her pension would kick in? As described below, the 
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, including being barred from or at 
least highly marked in employment prospects, might actually be quite similar to the 
consequences of a “deceptive” polygraph result. 
Nonetheless, accepting Justice Thomas’s distinctions between the criminal 
courtroom and pre-employment screening for the sake of argument, the policy 
concerns he articulates (particularly regarding the co-opting of the fact-finder’s role 
in a trial) are at a minimum illustrative of polygraph reliability debates generally. 
IV. DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS OUTSIDE OF UNRELIABILITY 
Dangerous implications of using the polygraph in pre-employment screenings 
exist outside of those directly derived from the test’s unreliability. Anyone 
concerned about policies that disparately impact racial minorities—in employment 
and beyond—should be concerned about social science research suggesting that 
the population most affected by polygraph testing is disproportionately comprised 
of minorities. Additionally, pre-employment polygraph testing implicates two other 
civil rights concerns, even for those who are not necessarily “falsely” labeled 
deceptive. First, the standard of judging a past act—that one’s disclosure about an 
unrelated misdeed from a remote time could be used as a justification for denying 
an employment opportunity in the present—is out of sync with recent successful 
“Ban the Box” movements demanding a right to privacy regarding one’s past 
actions for current, unrelated job functions. Secondly, anyone interested in the due 
process considerations animating Miranda protections should be similarly 
concerned about the coercive environment of polygraph testing. 
 
111. Polygraph Statement of Special Agent Smith, supra note 96. 
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A. Racial Concerns 
The use of the polygraph test to screen potential employees is particularly 
alarming when considered against a backdrop of social science research.  Recent 
psychology studies indicate that the invisible community of people screened out 
from job opportunities might be comprised of a disproportionate number of 
minorities. This research shows that for groups already socially stigmatized, 
polygraph tests might be even more inaccurate than for the general population: 
Recently, research has confirmed experimentally that both stigma bearers 
and perceivers exhibit cardiovascular patterns of response associated with 
threat during performance situations that are not metabolically demanding. 
This research typically demonstrates these effects during task performance 
but not during baseline or resting periods, suggesting the possibility that 
physiological responses to relevant and comparison questions might be 
differentially affected on polygraph tests.112 
In 1987 hearings before a Senate subcommittee convened to study polygraphs 
in the workplace, New York’s attorney general reported receiving “complaints 
about a polygraph operator who consistently fails a much higher percentage of black 
subjects than white subjects.”113 Twenty years after his report, research points to 
the subjective nature of polygraph testing, as described earlier. Polygraph use, then, 
can become a site for enacting one’s implicit racial biases. Implicit racial biases: 
[T ]ypically refer to unconscious anti-black bias in the form of negative 
stereotypes (beliefs) and attitudes (feelings) that are widely held, can 
conflict with conscious attitudes, and can predict a subset of real world 
behaviors. For instance, implicit racial biases can influence whether black 
individuals receive callback interviews and life-saving medical procedures, 
as well as whether individuals exhibit nonverbal discomfort when 
interacting with non-whites. Decades of research demonstrate that most 
Americans are unconsciously biased against black individuals.114 
Aside from the subjectivity in reading polygraph results, recent research also 
confirms that certain members of racially stigmatized groups—particularly African 
Americans—may “exhibit heightened cardiovascular threat responses in situations 
in which negative stereotypes about racially stigmatized groups are likely to exist.”115 
This phenomenon, deemed “stereotype threat” by social scientists, affects 
performance because “being negatively stereotyped redirect[s] cognitive resources 
away from the task at hand, leading to deficient performances.”116 Stereotype threat 
 
112. NRC Report, supra note 37, at 88 (citation omitted). 
113.  Polygraphs in the Workplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 
100th Cong. 3 (1987) (statement of Robert Abrams, Att’y Gen. of the State of N.Y.). 
114. L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2961, 2962–63 (2015) (footnotes omitted); see also Ariela Rutbeck-Goldman & L. Song 
Richardson, Race and Objective Reasonableness in Use of Force Cases: An Introduction to Some Relevant 
Social Science, 8 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 145 (2017) 
115. NRC Report, supra note 37, at 88 (citation omitted). 
116. Richardson, supra note 114, at 3. 
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has been examined recently to examine and help explain phenomena ranging from 
test-taking to police violence. The 2003 NRC Report about polygraph testing drew 
upon a 2000-2001 study, which found heightened blood pressure rates amongst 
African American participants during testing that measured their cognitive 
responses to difficult test items.117 The Report concluded, “[t]he experimental 
situations in which these stigma studies have occurred bear a striking resemblance 
to polygraph testing situations, particularly employee screening tests.”118 
The derivative effects of false positives, particularly their distorted effect on 
racial minorities, urge a careful reconsideration of the polygraph’s use in pre-
employment screening. 
B. Other Civil Rights Concerns 
Aside from the disproportionate impact that polygraph examinations likely 
have on minority populations, there are two additional civil rights concerns that 
should inform the use of polygraphs in employment settings. First, policymakers 
should consider whether information about one’s past should reasonably preclude 
the opportunity to participate in gainful employment in the future. Second, 
information obtained during the polygraph is often elicited in a testing environment 
that mirrors a custodial interrogation, but lacks the same protections. Therefore, 
one might expect a prevalence of false confessions in the pre-employment 
polygraph context, which is clearly contrary to the asserted purpose of utilizing the 
test to begin with.   
1. Relation of Questions to Job Responsibilities 
While most policymakers might outwardly agree that one’s past is not 
determinative of one’s future actions, the polygraph is inherently backward-looking. 
The NRC report noted that polygraph use in the employment context is “even more 
complicated because it involves inferences about future behavior on the basis of 
information about past behaviors that may be quite different (e.g., does past use of 
illegal drugs, or lying about such use on a polygraph test, predict future spying?).”119 
The question of how related the prior offense is to the essential duties of a 
prospective job is, in and of itself, a debate that many states have taken up in “Ban 
the Box” campaigns. “Ban the Box” campaigns seek an end to the “criminal history” 
section on a job application, compelling disclosure only for related offenses; the 
“Box” in the campaign title refers to the checkbox for former convictions on an 
employment application.120 Traditionally, this advocacy has been led by states, 
individual nonprofits, and community activists concerned with the high rate of 
 
117. NRC Report, supra note 37, at 88–89. 
118. Id. at 88. 
119. Id. at 2. 
120. For examples of state-by-state Ban the Box campaigns, see End Discrimination at 
Your Workplace, TAKE THE FAIR CHANCE PLEDGE!, http://bantheboxcampaign.org/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8SV3-VBQ7] ( last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
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formerly incarcerated people not being able to secure any sort of employment after 
release. These campaigns achieved a major victory in November 2015, when 
President Obama announced that he would direct some federal agencies to “ban 
the box” or “delay inquiries into criminal history until later in the hiring process.”121 
Although President Obama’s order did not affect federal contractors, this step was 
important both symbolically and practically. It signified that the federal 
government, at that time, understood that one’s past actions are not determinative 
of one’s future actions, and promoted an understanding that one should not 
continue to be automatically punished for the past’s misdeeds (by being immediately 
screened out from a prospective job).122 
The consequential disqualification from future job opportunities should be 
taken into account in any sort of balancing test to assess the government’s use of 
the polygraph. Criminology literature about “collateral consequences,” also called 
“invisible punishment,”123 can be illuminating here. “[C]ollateral consequences of a 
criminal conviction” are described by the American Bar Association (ABA) as “legal 
sanctions and restrictions imposed upon people because of their criminal record.”124 
The ABA has undergone a large-scale project to document collateral consequences 
and organize them into a comprehensive inventory.125 Another group, The National 
Employment Law Project, has found that approximately sixty-five million people 
in the United States have a criminal record, and an array of restrictions drastically 
limit the ability of these individuals to work.126 Law schools, legal aid societies, other 
organizations, and elected representatives around the country are working to 
alleviate these burdens by, as one example, operating expungement clinics for minor 
offenses.127 Federal judges are beginning to take note of collateral consequences as 
 
121. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces New Actions 
to Promote Rehabilitation and Reintegration for the Formerly-Incarcerated ( Nov. 2, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/02/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new-
actions-promote-rehabilitation [https://perma.cc/X3QL-LQBY ]. 
122. At the time of this writing, there is no direct statement by the Trump administration 
regarding lie detectors, Ban the Box campaigns, or whistleblowers generally. 
123. See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15 (Marc Mauer & 
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
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www.abacollateralconsequences.org/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20171220223047/https:// 
niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/] ( last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
125. Id. 
126. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
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127. See, e.g., Kia Gregory, Legal Volunteers Help Those Seeking a Clean Slate and a New  
Start, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 21, 2011, 3:01 AM ), http://www.philly.com/philly/hp/news_update/ 
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2015), http://www.afro.com/baltimore-naacp-plans-expungement-clinics/ [https://perma.cc/U482- 
Final to Printer_Rutbeck-Goldman (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:55 AM 
2017 ]  AN “UNFAIR AND CRUEL WEAPON” 743 
well. For example, in May 2015, federal judge John Gleeson attempted to expunge 
the criminal record of a woman he convicted of fraud over a decade earlier after 
learning the extent to which her record was interfering with her ability to sustain a 
long-term job.128  Commentators believed that this was the first time a federal judge 
took such a step.   
While this Note has been primarily concerned with the community of “false 
positives,” people who are “innocent” of wrongdoing by any definition, denial of 
employment opportunities based on one’s past history operates within larger 
societal racial structures. In other words, any push to include the use of the 
polygraph in pre-employment screening as part of a “Ban the Box” policy decision 
would relate directly to the same disparate racial and economic realities that animate 
other concerns quickly becoming prime focuses in mainstream American 
conversations. The Obama-era FBI, at least, was aware of conversations about the 
disparate racial impact of police violence and the resulting push to increase diversity 
in U.S. police forces.129 The FBI has long struggled with diversity: of the bureau’s 
13,455 agents, only 606 (4.5 percent) are African American, and only 6.8 percent 
are Hispanic.130 Members of racial minorities facing the sort of psychological 
phenomena inherent in a polygraph examination, then, sit for their tests with this 
underrepresentation as a backdrop. The effects of this backdrop might manifest 
themselves through a stereotype threat expectation loop—the fear of not wanting to 
confirm the Bureau’s historic attitude and mistreatment of African American 
officers, which culminated in a 2001 class action settlement131—as well as through 
the effects of tokenism because of the small number of agents who identify as 
members of a minority group. Professor Pamela Braboy Jackson’s study on African 
American leaders, for example, found that racial rarity increases “token stress,” 
 
EQ7A]; Expungement Clinic, LAW STUDENTS IN COURT, http://dclawstudents.org/expunge-dc/ 
[https://perma.cc/9W63-CRR2] (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
128. Rob Wile, For the First Time Anyone Knows of, a Judge has Expunged a Woman’s Criminal 
Record Because it was Ruining Her Career, FUSION.NET (May 29, 2015, 2:23 PM), http://fusion.net/
for-the-first-time-anyone-knows-of-a-judge-has-expunge-1793848012 (describing Judge Gleeson’s 
decision to expunge the record of the mother of five known only as Jane Doe, who was found guilty 
in 2002 of faking injuries from a car accident to attempt to collect insurance money). Judge Gleeson’s 
ruling was later reversed by the Second Circuit, finding that the district court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s motion. See Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 2016).    
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and the Ferguson Police Department’s treatment of African Americans. U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf 
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130. Sari Horwitz, As U.S. Pushes Police to Diversify, FBI Struggles to Get Minorities in the Door, 
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including having to show greater competence in the job force, at the same time as 
experiencing a severe sense of isolation and other negative effects.132 
Similar to certain criminal convictions, when one is denied a government job 
for failing the polygraph test, this is considered a “black mark” that will likely 
disqualify someone from federal employment for life.133 Based on the reality  
of which groups are overrepresented in the criminal justice realm generally,  
social science research suggests that these life-long consequences will fall 
disproportionately on racial minorities in the pre-employment context as well.134 
These concerns should urge careful reconsideration of the use of the polygraph in 
pre-employment settings.  
2. Lack of Due Process Protections for What Can Become an Interrogation 
The polygraph’s coerciveness is another point of concern in its pre-
employment screening use. Returning briefly to the past crimes of the CBP agents 
discussed above, one can find another disturbing aspect: their disclosure. The 
disclosures of these crimes seem irrational: why would somebody confess to these 
serious crimes when applying for a job? On the one hand, this seems to show that 
something procedurally is not working: the CBP website, after all, claims that all 
questions will be previewed with, and explained to, the examinee. Is this preview 
genuinely taking place if CBP agents are confessing to these sorts of crimes? Likely 
the answer depends on the examiner, whose individual technique, as described 
above, is highly variable. 
There have already been documented examples of prospective employees who 
have been siphoned into the criminal justice system through admissions made in a 
polygraph examination. One prospective CBP officer in Arizona, for example, 
admitted during a pre-employment polygraph screening that he was the driver in a 
2009 single-car crash that killed a passenger.135 Another disclosed that he had 
fondled his best friend’s young sister and engaged in bestiality. He was then arrested 
on suspicion of sexual contact with a minor and three counts of bestiality. These 
are only the ones for which court records have been able to be obtained: CBP “has 
not made public how many cases have been forwarded for further investigation or 
prosecution or how many have led to convictions.”136 
The point here is not at all that the first officer did not commit a wrong, or 
that he should not have been discovered by the police. The point, instead, is that 
these stories tell us something about just how coercive the environment of a 
polygraph examination is, resembling that of an interrogation more than any kind 
of stand-alone “test.” The polygraph examination’s environment is similar in several 
 
132. Pamela Braboy Jackson et al., Composition of the Workplace and Psychological Well-Being: 
The Effects of Tokenism on America’s Black Elite, 74 SOC. FORCES 543 (1995). 
133. Koerner, supra note 89. 
134. RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 126, at 4. 
135. Becker, supra note 86. 
136. Id. 
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ways to the custodial interrogation that the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona 
was concerned with.137 First, the examination takes place in privacy, which “results 
in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”138 
This gap in the public’s knowledge, then, is partially filled in by the stories that 
outspoken critics of the polygraph have provided: critics including Agent Smith, 
(whose story of attempting to transfer into special services was described above), 
and Doug Williams (who was, as described above, convicted of administering 
counter-measure instructions after years of administering the polygraph). In fact, 
Williams considered himself on a crusade to fill in those gaps in knowledge: to bring 
down the polygraph’s use by publicizing how the examination worked (especially to 
his paid clients, with whom he would conduct a “run-through” of a realistic testing 
environment). The crucial point here is that because there is very little information 
available about what exactly is happening to thousands of potential employees on 
an annual basis in their polygraph screening, these screenings are subject to less 
regulation, review, and consideration. 
Second, in this private environment, the examinee is one-on-one with the 
examiner. One might initially respond to this by remarking that this factor is no 
different from a typical job interview itself. However, it is precisely this similitude 
that may lead to duplicity. It is not hard to imagine that prospective employees are 
unprepared for a line of questioning falling outside of essential job duties and 
qualifications for the position they are interviewing for, and are therefore 
unprepared for the moment that the examination turns into an interrogation. 
Because it is part of a job interview, the examinee will likely be more trusting of the 
examiner; she likely does not think of herself as a suspect. The one-on-one nature 
of the examination, which the Miranda court considered in crafting its watershed 
interrogation safeguard doctrine, does work here as well: the examiner has even 
more of an opportunity to craft a “friendly” persona in an environment that, 
initially, does not seem hostile. However, the “standard interrogation techniques” 
that informed the Supreme Court’s landmark Miranda decision are potentially 
utilized by polygraph examiners. An examiner might, for example, emphasize how 
badly he or she wants the examinee to get the job, similar to an investigator 
emphasizing that he or she is on the same team as a suspect in trying to solve a 
crime. An examiner might downplay the importance of the polygraph, similar to an 
investigator downplaying the importance of the suspect’s role in a crime.139 Boise 
State University psychology professor and polygrapher Charles Honts explains,  
The polygraph examiner is going to tell them that lying is worse than 
confessing. That’s not necessary [sic] true, but that’s what they say . . . . 
 
137. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
138. Id. at 448. 
139. See id. at 450 n.12 (quoting Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 562, 582 (1954), where the 
interrogator-psychiatrist told the accused, “We do sometimes things that are not right, but in a fit of 
temper or anger we sometimes do things [that] we aren’t really responsible for,” and again, “We know 
that morally you were just in anger. Morally, you are not to be condemned”). 
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They tell people: “We know people aren’t perfect. People make mistakes. 
But you won’t get the job if you lie.” Minimization and justification—it’s 
standard interrogation technique.140 
Outside of these factors resembling the criminal interrogations discussed in 
Miranda, the pseudoscientific nature of the polygraph machine itself can elicit 
certain statements. During this interrogation, belief in the polygraph’s reliability and 
accuracy influences the outcome: 
In this case, the polygraph test has a useful role independently of whether 
it can accurately detect deception: it is effective if the examinee believes it can 
detect deception. Admissions of this kind provide evidence of the value of the 
polygraph examination for investigative purposes, but they do not provide 
evidence that the polygraph test accurately detects deception.141 
One is reminded of a classic scene from HBO’s “The Wire,” where a suspect 
on the verge of confessing is strapped to a “polygraph,” which turns out to be a 
copy machine.142 It matters not what the machine is actually doing; it matters what 
the suspect believes the machine is capable of doing. 
Even if one believes that the polygraph is faulty and inaccurate, an examiner 
can call upon other methodology to elicit results. One need only refer to Agent 
Smith’s experiences to understand that even examinees who do not believe in the 
polygraph’s infallibility are subjected to other interrogation techniques. These 
techniques do not take advantage of the examinee’s naiveté through a trick like that 
portrayed in “The Wire.” Instead, the examiner might push the examinee to a point 
of weakness through verbal and sometimes physical intimidation. Furthermore, 
Agent Smith’s experiences show that a polygraph examination can last for several 
hours, similar to the length of a criminal interrogation. 
Based on these concerns, demonstrating the potential for coerciveness in the 
setting of a polygraph examination, one should be wary of the potential false 
confessions elicited through such an interrogation. One can understand, for 
example, how an examinee would try to please the examiner by guessing what he or 
she wants to hear, similar to a suspect in a criminal matter who wants an end to her 
custody and tries to guess what the “right” answer is. Confessions are elicited, 
criminologists explain, because examinees undergo a rational cost-benefit analysis 
of their options: 
Psychological interrogation is effective at eliciting confessions because of 
a fundamental fact of human decision-making—people make optimizing 
choices given the alternatives they consider. Psychologically-based 
interrogation works effectively by controlling the alternatives a person 
considers and by influencing how these alternatives are understood. The 
techniques interrogators use have been selected to limit a person’s 
attention to certain issues, to manipulate his perceptions of his present 
situation, and to bias his evaluation of the choices before him. The 
 
140. Quoted in Becker, supra note 86. 
141. See NRC Report, supra note 37, at 22 (emphasis added) 
142. The Wire: More with Less (HBO television broadcast Jan. 6, 2008). 
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techniques used to accomplish these manipulations are so effective that if 
misused they can result in decisions to confess from the guilty and innocent 
alike. Police elicit the decision to confess from the guilty by leading them 
to believe that the evidence against them is overwhelming, that their fate is 
certain (whether or not they confess), and that there are advantages that 
follow if they confess.143 
Here, the “advantages that follow” a confession, according to an examinee, 
involve employment and all of its attendant benefits. The same psychological 
techniques used in criminal interrogation are also employed in polygraph 
examinations, and the same rational cost-benefit decision-making is utilized by an 
examinee. However, unlike the use of these techniques in the criminal justice 
system, use of these psychological techniques in a polygraph setting have not been 
discussed, and curtailed, by the United States Supreme Court. As discussed above, 
the results of these tests can be just as damaging to a prospective employee as a 
conviction for a minor crime, and a confession elicited might be false for the same 
reasons: it might be made only for the purpose of escaping the environment as 
quickly as possible. The government, as described above, took note of some of these 
risks in passing the EPPA. However, thousands of potential federal employees every 
year are still subjected to the interrogation of a polygraph examination, without 
judicial review or other safeguards. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal government might have succeeded in its prosecution, and eventual 
sentencing, of polygraph countermeasure instructor Doug Williams. However, the 
sentencing of one individual will not solve, or even alleviate, the larger issues raised 
by his case. Instead, Williams’s sentencing carries with it several important questions 
regarding fair employment practices and national security. This Note has posed just 
some of these pressing questions. 
First, the polygraph’s unreliability, coupled with its definitive nature (i.e. that 
a finding of deception is more often than not the final verdict in an employee’s job 
prospects or continuing employment), is a fatal combination. This fatal combination 
gives rise to an “invisible community” of federal employees turned away from 
employment prospects, and ongoing employees terminated from their jobs.  
This invisible community is not widely researched, but should be a source of  
serious concern, especially given the machine’s unreliability and subjectiveness. 
Additionally, the use of the polygraph might lead to a sense of complacency and/or 
overconfidence on the part of the government since real security threats, such as 
Aldrich Ames, still pass the polygraph and continue on with their work undetected. 
Furthermore, social science research suggests that this invisible community of 
barred prospective employees is disproportionately comprised of racial minorities, 
 
143. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and 
Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U.L. REV. 979, 985 (1997). 
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who react to stereotype threat and other stigma-related expectancy feedback loops 
in their physiological reactions to stressful situations more often than white 
employees. Relatedly, policy considerations, such as those underscoring “Ban the 
Box” campaigns, urge reconsideration of polygraph use in pre-employment 
screening more generally. Specifically, one’s past is not determinative of one’s future 
actions. Additionally, since a polygraph test can quickly become an interrogation 
akin to one in a criminal setting, it is important to keep in mind that none of the 
safeguards that exist in the latter situation are required for the former. This helps 
explain why someone might confess to a crime or a bad act that is unrelated to the 
sought-after employment opportunity, but why these confessions might also be 
false. 
For all of these reasons, using the polygraph as the “judge and juror” in the 
pre-employment setting is severely misguided. Now is the time to re-evaluate such 
use. 
 
